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A War Examined

Gaza 2014: Israel’s Attrition vs Hamas’
Exhaustion
Eitan Shamir and Eado Hecht
© 2014 Eitan Shamir and Eado Hecht

Abstract: While Hamas adopted a strategy of psychological exhaustion of Israel’s civilians, Israel employed physical attrition of Hamas’
military capabilities. This article examines how these strategies interacted with each other, assesses the strategic gains and losses on each
side, and suggests some lessons relevant for American strategists.

O

peration “Protective Edge” is the Israel Defense Forces’ name
for its latest military operation against Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza during the months of July–August
2014. This article analyzes the competing strategies of Israel and Hamas
in this specific bout of fighting and assesses how effective they were
in achieving their political ends. By strategy we mean how each side
attempted to optimize its physical and psychological use of violence in
achieving its political goals. Strategy is the art of deciding what violent
acts would best assist in bringing about one’s political goal, and then
executing them. In some cases, the actions chosen might be synonymous with the political goals (for example, when the political goal is
conquest of territory) but often they are only a means of hurting the rival
sufficiently so he agrees to acquiesce to the political demand.
Israel’s military strikes on Gaza and Hamas were much more destructive in terms of loss of life and property than those of Hamas on Israel.
However the efficacy of military action is measured not by how much
carnage and destruction it wreaks on the enemy, but by the achievement of political goals and the cost in terms of resources expended and
destruction suffered in return.
The similarity in military actions notwithstanding, the specific
political context of Operation “Protective Edge” was very different
from “Cast Lead” 2008 and “Defensive Pillar” 2012. By 2014, Hamas
had suffered a severe financial crisis that threatened its ability to rule
Gaza. As a result, we believe Hamas used force to cause the main actors
– Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and others – to release their
strangle-hold on Hamas’ revenues. This desperation drove Hamas to
endure a much higher level of physical damage before agreeing to a
ceasefire. Israel failed to read this situation correctly, which led to surprise over Hamas’ determination to fight.
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In the first section, we analyze the wider context and the rivals’
political goals on the eve of hostilities. In the second section, we describe
how each developed its strategy to match its political goals and how the
two strategies interacted with each other and were modified according
to developments on the ground. In the final section, we assess the gains
and losses of each side and discuss potential lessons for America and its
allies.

The Wider Context: Political Goals Prior to Operations
Hamas' Political Goal: Staying in Power

The recent bout of fighting between Israel and Gaza is just the latest
escalation against the backdrop of almost constant fighting between
Jews and Arabs since 1920. Although Operation Protective Edge has
an official start-date, 8 July 2014, and an an official end-date, 26 August
2014, it would be inaccurate to portray it as isolated conflict. In fact, even
with regard to the short-term processes that led to the Israeli decision
to initiate another operation the aforementioned start and end dates are
mere formalities. The fighting did not begin then, and is unlikely to end
for any appreciable period of time. Israel’s decision to initiate Operation
Protective Edge was a response to Hamas’ escalation of rocket and
mortar fire – an escalation that began gradually from 13 June.
Hamas’ ultimate goal, as declared in its charter, is to destroy the
state of Israel and establish a Palestinian Arab state based on the Shariya
– the laws of Islam.1 However, Hamas leaders are fully aware attaining
this goal is not feasible for now, and they must first achieve domination
of the Palestinian nation as a whole. Therefore, the medium-term political goal of Hamas is defeating rival Palestinian factions – especially the
only one roughly equal to it in political and military strength, the secular
Fatah.
After winning a majority in the January 2006 elections and becoming the official government of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas seemed
closer to this goal. However, over the following year the Fatah party,
led by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, attempted to
undermine the Hamas government. The political rivalry deteriorated
repeatedly into violence and, finally, into a brief civil war in 2007. Hamas’
largest constituency and source of strength lay in Gaza, whereas Fatah’s
(helped by Israel) was in Judea and Samaria. The Palestinian Authority
split into two separate entities with only a tenuous bureaucratic link
between them.

Hamas’ Budgetary Crises

Officially, the border between Gaza and Egypt has been closed
since the Hamas takeover of Gaza. Unofficially, it is open to any and all
types of goods, both civilian and military. To maintain the charade of a
closed border, goods were transferred into Gaza via numerous tunnels
dug between the Egyptian and Gazan sides of Rafiah. While officially
frowning on this import of goods, both Israel and Egypt did little to
prevent it, seeing it as a way to keep the Gaza economy afloat. What

1      For a copy of the Hamas Charter in English see: http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.
thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html?chocaid=397
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worried the Israelis was not the import of civilian goods, most of which
could in any case be imported through Israel itself, but the import of
weapons and dual-use materials that could be used for military purposes.
Trade with and through Egypt reached its peak with the emergence of
the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt.
The retaking of power in Egypt by the military regime of Abdel
Fatah al-Sisi was disastrous for Hamas. The new regime saw Hamas
as an ally of the hated Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist groups
attacking Egyptian troops in Sinai. In summer 2013, Sisi retaliated by
strangling Hamas’ financial windpipe; within months the Egyptian
army located and shut down hundreds of smuggling-tunnels, and by
June 2014 more than 1,500 of the estimated 1,800 tunnels had been shut
down – approximately halving Hamas’ annual revenues.2 Iran’s donations to Hamas had already been cut drastically after Hamas supported
the Syrian Sunni rebels fighting against the Iranian-supported Assad
regime.3
Hamas’ immediate political goals were: removing all Israeli and
Egyptian control over imports into Gaza by building an international
seaport, an international airport, and allowing free travel through the
land crossings between Gaza and Egypt and Gaza and Israel.4 Assessing
whether Hamas won or lost this war depends on whether it can achieve
some of these goals.

Israel’s Political Objectives - Containment and Quiet

Israel’s political goal vis-à-vis Gaza can be summed up in one word
– containment, that is a quiet border, or at least a reduction in the intensity of Palestinian attacks from Gaza to a level regarded as no more than
an irritation.
Political anarchy in Gaza would prevent achievement of these
goals; only a strong central government can impose its authority on
rogue elements within its own ranks or smaller groups, such as the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Resistance Committees, to prevent
them from provoking Israel. Since 2007, the Israelis have not seen any
Palestinian group, Fatah included, capable of replacing Hamas as this
central authority. Therefore, destroying Hamas is considered counterproductive. Better to “educate” Hamas that attacks on Israel damage
its higher priority interests. Thus the goal is to punish it enough to hurt
it, but not enough so that it loses control. Israel’s use of force is not
designed to throw Hamas out of power, only to deter it from launching
further attacks on Israel.
However, there are constraints on Israel’s use of force: (a) its sensitivity to Israeli casualties, (b) domestic cultural aversion to causing civilian
casualties, (c) diplomatic and economic dependence on the United
States, (d) diplomatic and economic ties with Europe, and (e) danger of
a local escalation in Gaza spilling over to other borders. Together, these
2      Eric Trager, Sisi’s Egypt and the Gaza Conflict, Policy Analysis (Washington, DC: Washington
Institute, July 14, 2014); “Egypt Army Destroys 13 More Gaza Tunnels,” Ynet News, July 27, 2014.
3      Hillel Frisch, The Flimsy Palestinian “Unity” Government, BESA Center Perspectives Paper, no.
251 (Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, June 26, 2014).
4      Ron Tira, “Operation Protective Edge: Ends, Ways and Means and the Distinct Context,”
Infinity Journal (September 2014), 3.
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constraints limit the range of military actions Israel can use in support
of its policy.

A Clash of Strategies – Israel’s Attrition versus Hamas’
Exhaustion

On 12 June 2014 a team of Hamas terrorists murdered three Jewish
teenagers. Israel responded by arresting and interrogating hundreds
of suspects – most affiliated with Hamas.5 Initially, Hamas denied
involvement, but later admitted the killers were indeed members of the
organization, but that its leaders had no foreknowledge of the crime.6
However, the Hamas leadership immediately sanctioned an increase in
the rate of rockets and mortars fired from Gaza into Israel. The previous
“dribble” of a few rockets and mortars fired every few days became a
daily occurrence and gradually escalated from one to three rockets per
day to a few dozen per day.7
This escalation was portrayed as an act of solidarity with the
Palestinians in Judea and Samaria who were being “attacked” by Israeli
forces searching for the teenagers. Israel’s initial response was minimal
– a few air strikes each day attempting to hit the launcher teams. Israelis
hoped once the bodies of the Israeli teenagers were found and the search
called off, the fighting around Gaza would wane too.
On 7 July the dribble of rockets and mortar bombs became a flood:
134 were fired into southern Israel.8 That night Israel’s government
ordered a change in strategy. Instead of hunting active launchers and
launch-teams, the air force was ordered to attack the military-terrorist
infrastructure in Gaza: all known launchers, storage sites, command
posts and individual commanders. The rate of air strikes jumped from a
few per day to 150 to 200.9
There was one important difference between the initial strikes of
Operation Protective Edge and those of Operations Cast Lead and
Defensive Pillar – the latter two had surprised the Palestinians.10 Surprise
enabled the IDF to kill and destroy a significant number of personnel
and equipment before the Palestinians employed them – shortening
their endurance. This time, the Palestinians had the initiative, and the
initial strikes by the IDF were less successful.

5      “News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (June 18-24, 2014),” Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, June 24, 2014, www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20661.
6      Jethro Mullen and Talal Abu Rahma, “Hamas Admits its Men Abducted Israeli Teens, says its
Leaders didn’t Know,” CNN, August 23, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/22/world/meast/
mideast-crisis/index.html.
7      December 2012 (one month after the end of Operation Defensive Pillar) to 12 June 2014
the Palestinians fired 208 rockets and mortar bombs from Gaza into Israel. From 13 June to 6 July
they fired another 232, see: “Terror Data and Trends,” Israeli Security Agency, http://www.shabak.
gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reports/Pages/default.aspx; “Monthly Summary-June 2014,” Israeli
Security Agency, http://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/Monthly%20summary%20
–%20June%202014.pdf; “Monthly Summary-July 2014,” Israeli Security Agency, http://www.shabak.
gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/Monthly%20summary%20–%20July%202014%20docx.pdf.
8      Ibid.
9      IDF Spokesperson Unit, News Updates, 3-9 July, 2014, http://www.idf.il.
10      Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, “‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted
Intractable Conflict,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 1 (2014): 85.
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On the following days, the rate of Palestinian fire varied from a low
of 115 rockets and mortars to a high of 177 per day.11 The variance seems
to be only slightly connected to the intensity of Israeli air strikes and
had more to do with internal Palestinian logistical issues. To increase
pressure on Hamas leaders and commanders, the IDF began to destroy
their homes; the families were first warned to leave the houses. Unable
to conduct a decisive knock-out blow, not wishing to cause significant
collateral damage and protected by the Iron Dome, Israel adopted a
strategy of gradual attrition of Hamas military infrastructure.
Israel expected a replay of Operation Defensive Shield (2012),
meaning, an exchange of stand-off fire, in which Israeli casualties would
be minimal, and Palestinian casualties would be considerably higher,
with the Palestinians deciding they had made their point and calling a
halt to hostilities. As a palliative, Israel would offer some concessions.
However, the Palestinian political goal and its commensurate strategy were not what Israel expected. Because of its dire financial situation,
Hamas leaders decided to gamble on instigating a full-scale war in the
hope of causing a major international crisis. Knowing the limitations
of their artillery weapons versus Israeli defenses they prepared two
complementary strategies:

First: Match Israel’s strategy of attrition with one of psychological exhaustion:

Rockets might not cause many Israeli casualties. However, since
they could reach 60 percent of Israel’s population, they could disrupt
Israel’s welfare and economy for some time. Even if no civilians were
killed, repeated disruption might damage Israeli morale and exert pressure on its government.
Furthermore, Hamas planned to bypass the Iron Dome and border
defenses by using tunnels and amphibious raids on Israeli settlements
near Gaza. A few successful infiltration attacks inside these settlements
might cause significant psychological shock to the Israelis.

Second: Igniting an international diplomatic offensive against Israel by deliberately increasing the collateral damage caused to Palestinian civilians:

The Palestinians have been using human shields, hospitals, schools,
UN facilities, mosques, hotels and private homes to hide and protect
personnel and equipment since the late 1960s. Hamas reached new levels
with the permanent embedding of bombs into the walls of many of these
buildings, deliberately firing from them or adjacent locations at Israeli
civilians and troops in order to provoke retaliatory fire that would harm
Palestinian civilians, UN personnel or foreign journalists. In fact, from
Hamas’ political viewpoint, the more Palestinian civilians killed and
wounded the better, as this would be more likely to cause international
intervention against Israel.12 However, this strategy has a culmination
point since too many casualties break morale.

11      “Monthly Summary-July 2014,” Israeli Security Agency, http://www.shabak.gov.il/
SiteCollectionDocuments/Monthly%20summary%20–%20July%202014%20docx.pdf.
12      See captured Hamas doctrinal manual: Bob Frederick, “Hamas’ Disturbing ‘Human
Shields’ Manual,” New York Post, August 5, 2014, http://nypost.com/2014/08/05/hamas
-manual-details-civilian-death-plan-israel/.
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The Impact of Violence on Israel’s and Hamas’ Political Will:

The disruption and casualties caused by rockets fired into Israel
seems not to have shaken Israel’s population. In central Israel, people
took cover when necessary and then resumed everyday activities. The
only significant success was fleeting – a two-day halt of foreign international flights into Israel when one rocket landed a few kilometers
from Ben-Gurion International Airport. In southern Israel, where the
intensity was greater, the economy suffered more, and there were more
casualties; but general support for the government never wavered.
The two amphibious raids conducted in the first days of the war also
left no lasting impressions. Both were detected as they reached the shore
and all infiltrators killed. Conversely, the first infiltration attack through
the offensive-tunnels to the outskirts of an Israeli border village on 17
July caused extreme consternation, despite the fact there were no Israeli
casualties.13 The very idea of such attacks terrified the majority of Israeli
civilians living there in a way that thousands of rockets and mortars fired
over the past decade had not, even before the introduction of the Iron
Dome anti-rocket defense system. It should be stressed the existence of
the offensive-tunnels was not a surprise to the Israeli government, the
IDF or even the civilians.14
Ground fighting was much fiercer than in Operation Cast Lead
when Israeli troops entered Gaza, and Hamas ground troops fled. This
time Hamas fought to defend the tunnel system. Israeli forces searching for the tunnels inside Gaza suffered approximately 700 casualties
(45 of them fatal). Casualties among Palestinian fighters facing them
were significantly higher.15 While the Israelis searched for tunnels,
Hamas conducted more raids via yet undiscovered tunnels. Most of the
raiders were killed, but the IDF suffered 11 killed and at least a dozen
wounded in these actions. The ground battle did not stop the exchanges
of Palestinian artillery versus Israeli aerial fire, but did reduce them considerably: the daily rate of Palestinian fire dropped to less than half the
average before the offensive.16
On 4 August, after destroying 32 offensive-tunnels, the IDF withdrew and resumed its previous strategy of stand-off air strikes. The
Israeli government considered, but rejected a full scale invasion of Gaza
due to the expected number of Israeli and Palestinian casualties, and
the lack of a clear exit strategy.17 Aware of this decision, Hamas acted
13      There are three separate tunnel systems in Gaza: the smuggling-tunnels under the border
with Egypt; the defensive storage, tactical, communication and command-tunnels scattered throughout the district and, finally, the offensive-tunnels which were dug under the border with Israel.
Yochai Ofer, “Tzahal Sikel Pigua Khadira Gadol Derech Minheret Terror,” (Hebrew), NRG, July 17,
2014, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/597/355.html.
14      “2013 Annual Summary,” Israel Security Agency, http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/
EnTerrorData/Reports/Pages/2013AnnualSummary.aspx; “News of Terrorism and the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict (June 18–24),” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, June 24, 2014,
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20661. On the challenge of the offensive tunnels see:
Eado Hecht, “Gaza: How Hamas Tunnel Network Grew,” BBC, July 22, 2014, http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-middle-east-28430298.
15      IDF ground troops reported hundreds of Palestinian fighters killed and almost 200 captured.
See: http://tlv100.walla.co.il/?w=/22/2769412; http://rotter.net/cgi-bin/go-news.pl?file=27422.
html; http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/2689/2770804.
16     “Monthly Summary-July 2014,” Israeli Security Agency, http://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollection
Documents/Monthly%20summary%20–%20July%202014%20docx.pdf.
17      Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu Tried to Scare off Ministers to Get Gaza Occupation off the
Table,” HaAretz, August 6, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.609152 .
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with impunity. Finally, on 26 August, Hamas agreed to a month-long
ceasefire with no preconditions. In return, Israel, as a concession, agreed
to increase the fishing-zone.18

Analysis and Conclusions

Relative to previous rounds of escalated fighting between Israel and
Hamas, this bout was much more costly to both sides. Casualties and
damage were significantly higher.
Palestinian casualties are a major issue in the propaganda contest
between the rivals, and so all numbers should be regarded critically. The
Hamas government claims approximately 2,200 people were killed and
11,000 wounded in Gaza, and more than 75 percent of the dead were
civilians. Israel claims approximately half the dead were combatants and
many civilian deaths were caused by deliberate Hamas use of civilians
as human shields.19 Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians fled
from their homes. Thousands of buildings were damaged and will take
years to rebuild. Hamas’ rocket arsenal was drastically depleted (about a
fifth is estimated to be left), its offensive tunnels and some of its defensive tunnels destroyed. If published Israeli data is correct, at least 15
percent of Hamas military personnel were killed or wounded, including
a number of high-ranking individuals. Also, Hamas’ plans to raid Israeli
villages were foiled.
On the Israeli side, 14 civilians and 67 soldiers were killed, and
approximately 400 civilians and 705 soldiers were wounded. Several
buildings were destroyed and a few hundred damaged, but most only
superficially.
On the face of it, since Israel’s only political goal was a ceasefire, it
seems Israel was successful. The past seven months on the Gaza border
have been the quietest in decades. The reasons Hamas agreed to, and
so-far maintains, the long-term ceasefire are not known – there are,
however, indications the Israeli strategy of attrition was working, whereas
the Hamas strategy of exhaustion seemed to be failing. Also, there are
indications of mounting anger and desperation within the Gaza population at casualties and the destruction of its property. During the fighting,
Hamas reportedly executed political opponents under the pretext they
were Israeli spies.20 The expected international pressure on Israel did not
occur and even some of the Arab regimes, not only Egypt, seemed to
support Israel over Hamas. Finally, despite casualties and disruption of
life, the Israeli public did not exhibit signs of pressuring its government
to concede. The Israeli government apparently fended off calls by some
for more extensive ground operations.
Israel again lost the media and the propaganda struggle – despite
criticism of Hamas’ use of human shields, Israel’s actions are facing
a propaganda and lawfare (hostile UN inquiry) backlash over the
number of Palestinian civilians hurt and the damage to Gaza’s civilian
18      To prevent smuggling of weapons into Gaza by sea, Gazan fishermen are required to fish
only in a specific zone.
19      Richard Behar, “The Media Intifada: Bad Math, Ugly Truths about New York Times in
Israel-Hamas War,” Forbes, August 21, 2014.
20      “Hamas Executes 30 Suspected Collaborators: Report,” I24 News, July 29 2014, http://
www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/38508-140728-hamas-executes-30suspected-collaborators-report.
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infrastructure. Hamas’ resistance on the ground surprised the Israelis;
casualties were higher than expected. Hamas was able to maintain fire
throughout the operation, reaching Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and beyond,
and temporarily halt international air traffic to Israel. Major rifts were
exposed between the US administration and Israel on many issues.
Israel’s economy was visibly, though not significantly, hurt.
The current view in Jerusalem is toppling Hamas will only lead to
anarchy or require Israel to govern Gaza – both undesirable outcomes.
Therefore, maintaining a contained and weakened Hamas is Israel’s least
bad policy choice but then – how does it deter a resumption of harassment of Israeli border villages from Gaza?
This complex reality, coupled with the results of the fighting, may
gain the Palestinians certain achievements presently unforeseeable. In
Israel itself, parts of the population – especially those living near Gaza
– voice fears of renewed fighting and question Israeli government assurances they can return to their daily lives.
To this point we have discussed only the leading protagonists,
Israel and Hamas. However, the principal actor, whose actions, shutting the smuggling tunnels, precipitated this war, was Egypt. As the
war progressed Egypt continued to discover and destroy dozens of
tunnels. Egypt undoubtedly gained the most from this war – Hamas
is weakened and beholden to it, American and European attempts to
intervene diplomatically were rebuffed as were attempts by the White
House to involve Turkey and Qatar (both Egypt’s regional rivals) in the
negotiations. It was Egypt’s refusal to make any concessions to Hamas
that gradually enabled Israel to force Hamas to accept a ceasefire for no
tangible return. Egypt holds the keys to the political situation and most
of Hamas’ demands were actually directed at Egypt.
The political results of this operation are not clear-cut. Thus, the
term victory in the sense of a clear win-lose situation is irrelevant in this
case. It is possible both sides gained something each can call a victory.
Whatever the perceptions as to who gained more, the principal IsraeliPalestinian conflict has not been resolved, and it is fairly certain some
level of violence will continue.

Potential Lessons for America and its Allies

As shown by the evolution of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
Islamic extremism cannot be overcome in the traditional sense of eradicating the enemy, or getting him to renounce his stated political goals.
Thus, despite the many differences between the political and strategic
contexts of America’s war and that of Israel, both face similar situations.
They must develop strategies for conducting protracted – theoretically
unwinnable – wars.
Some defense experts have nicknamed Israel’s strategy “Mowing
the Grass.” The analogy is clear. Operation Protective Edge should not
be regarded as an independent event, it is part of a long-term strategy,
a strategy that alternates continuous routine low intensity activities
with occasional escalations, each in response to an escalation of hostile
activity in order to cut the “grass” back to an acceptable height. Each
operation has a short-term, a medium-term, and a long-term objective.
The short-term objective is to achieve a de-escalation of hostile attacks;
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the medium-term objective is to degrade the enemy’s capabilities so
as to deter him from renewing hostilities for as long as possible; the
long-term objective is to achieve a cumulative deterrence that will, at an
undetermined future date, gradually lead to a cessation of attacks.21 The
exact details may be different, but the general concept can be adapted to
the needs of the United States.
To succeed, a “grass-mowing” operation must inflict a certain level
of pain on the enemy. Israel’s experience has been that the destruction
of material assets is not particularly painful to its enemies. Material is
easy to replace. What hurts these organizations is the killing of personnel, the higher the rank the better.22 Most of these organizations have
a limited number of trained personnel – they take longer to replace.
Furthermore, although the ideology of these organizations eulogizes
suicide-attacks, the leaders are usually less suicidal than the lower-ranks.
A threat directed specifically at senior personnel often causes a reduction in activity. So searching for, and attacking, the senior commanders
of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), for example, is more
effective than killing a greater number of lower ranks. Still, the number
of combatants killed, wounded or captured as a percentage of the total
available, is an important tool for deterrence; the faster the casualties
accrue, the more effective the tool.
However, as shown in Operation Protective Edge, the level
of damage the organization is willing to endure at any specific time
depends on a wide variety of factors. What was unbearable for Hamas
in Operation Defensive Shield was bearable in Protective Edge, because
the political context had changed. Understanding the specific context is
crucial for planners. What worked in Iraq in 2007 might not be relevant
in 2014.
Over the past three decades, Israeli strategists have attempted to
reduce to a minimum the involvement of ground troops in major operations – the main incentive being the reduction of Israeli casualties. In
some cases the use of air power has proven sufficient, in others not.
There are tactical reasons why this is so: certain targets are not vulnerable to air strikes; when the only threat is aerial the enemy adapts his
actions accordingly. However, it seems the most important reason is
strategic: air strikes, especially when civilian casualties must be avoided,
take longer to achieve the level of damage required to compel the enemy
to request a cease fire. The necessary level of damage itself varies with
the political context of each escalation. Moreover, the enemy adapts and
consistently seeks ways to neutralize Western technological advantages.
Thus, destroying the offensive tunnel system required a ground operation. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continue to study the tactical

21      On the Israeli concept of “Cumulative Deterrence” see: Doron Almog, “Cumulative
Deterrence and the War on Terrorism,” Parameters 34, no. 4 (Winter 2004-05); Thomas Rid,
“Deterrence Beyond the State: The Israeli Experience,” Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 1 (April
2012).
22      For a discussion of the effectiveness of targeted killings, see Steven R. David, Fatal Choices:
Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing, BESA Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 51 (Israel: Begin-Sadat
Center for Strategic Studies, July 2002); This was also shown in Afghanistan and Iraq: Javier Jordan,
“The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign Against Al-Qaida Central: A Case Study,” Journal of
Strategic Studies 37, no. 1 (2014).
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lessons of the conflict, many of which are relevant to US forces.23 One
lesson, in particular, emerged clearly during the campaign – the need
for heavily protected armored personnel carriers and tanks in order to
increase survivability and reduce casualties.24
In sum, the United States finds itself fighting in similar wars under a
growing set of domestic and international constraints. As a great power,
it is less vulnerable than Israel to sanctions, propaganda and lawfare;
but it must still take these into account. Accordingly, Israel’s strategic
concept, however limited, might suit America’s current policy and
strategic objectives in regard to its fight with various jihadist, non-state
organizations.
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